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L'éviction du président Mohamed Morsi par l'armée égyptienne est un coup d'Etat militaire pur et simple. En effet, cette éviction répond à la définition d'un renversement illégal de la tête de l'Etat par l'armée, une faction interne, ou les services de sécurité, par l'utilisation de la force ou de la menace de l'utiliser. Les expériences passées de coups d'Etats militaires comme le renversement du gouvernement Mossadegh en Iran en 1953, de Salvador Allende au Chili en 1973, ou encore le putsch militaire en Algérie de 1992 nous rappellent que les coups d'Etats militaires ne sont jamais un bon mécanisme pour la résolution de conflits. Le coup d'Etat militaire en Egypte est un témoignage regrettable de l'échec de tous les acteurs politiques et des parties engagées dans la manière de gérer la période de transition qui a été caractérisée par une très forte polarisation.

Aujourd'hui, alors que la constitution a été suspendue et que l'armée a repris le pouvoir, quels sont les défis à relever pour l'Egypte ?

The ousting of President Mohamed Morsi by the Egyptian army is a military coup d'état pure and simple. Morsi's ousting qualifies for a military putsch which is by definition the illegal removal of the head of the state by the army or a faction within it, or the security services, through the use of force or the threat to using it. Past experiences of military coup d'état such as the toppling of the Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953, Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, and the military putsch in Algeria in 1992 remind us that military coups are never a smart tool for conflict resolution. The military coup in Egypt is a regrettable testimony for the failure of all political actors and stakeholders to manage the transition period, as a result of acute polarization. Now that the constitution has been suspended and the army has taken over what are the challenges faced by Egypt today?

June 30, 2013 marks the last day of the first year of President Morsi's rule in Egypt. For his supporters, this is something to celebrate as Egypt completes a year of democracy under democratically elected President. For his opponents, this is his last day in power.

The language of certainty was much higher amongst the opponents maybe a month ago, when the mobilization of Rebel (Tamarrud) movement was high collecting signatures to sack the President (withdraw confidence as they called it). The support to the President at that time from his group (the Muslim Brotherhood) was rather doubtful; some people expected that the group that dominated the Egyptian politics over this year of Morsi's rule would sacrifice the President to keep the organization intact, or that the Brotherhood would make all the possible retreats and present all the possible concessions to save itself and maybe the President. The anticipation was that Morsi would accept a referendum on his rule if not an early Presidential elections.

To defuse this certainty, Impartiality (Tagarrud) movement was launched as an opponent to Tamarrud. It was exactly the same way the Conscience (Dameer) Front was established to defuse the Salvation (Inquaz) Front.

Yet, the difference was striking. Dameer Front was made of benign quasi-Islamist and partially-secular supporters of Morsi. It was answering the Salvation Front made of secular liberal and socialist opponents. The realm of ideology dichotomy was still apparent; and things were not sorted as Islam versus Secularism at that point. But the second wave of opposing Morsi was totally different; it was fully radical against the Brotherhood and their so called "Islamic Rule" as the tone became higher by Tamarrud and the call became pro having a full rebellion and establishing a whole new regime through the "popular revolutionary will" and by means of violence (if necessary). This was highly spear-headed this time by the Popular Current (Hamdeen sabbahi) whose ideology matches that of Tamarrud and where the key leaders of the rebel movement come from this Populist Nasserist Socialist current. The tone was totally high against the Brotherhood as an Islamist group rather than a political opponent represented through the Freedom and Justice Party. Describing the Brotherhood as Kherfan (cheep) was abundant to the point that the cause was portrayed as a battle between Islam versus Secularism. This ignited a fully Islamist support to Morsi in the form of Tagarrud movement spear-headed by the Jamaa Islameyya and its Construction and Development Party.

stephen hesselDécès de Stephane Hessel
par Abbas Aroua

Stephane Hessel est décédé il y a trois jours. Il est mort trop jeune. Car dans sa tête et dans son cœur il n’a jamais perdu la flamme de la jeunesse, entretenue par l’amour de la justice et le combat ininterrompu pour les démunis, les opprimés et les agressés de la terre, de toute la terre.

« La vérité et la justice conservent le corps humain » aime à dire un ami ; j’ai pu constater cette dynamique à l’œuvre chez feu l’Abbé Pierre et le professeur Noam Chomsky, ainsi que chez mes maitres et amis Me Abdennour Ali-Yahia et Prof Johan Galtung, que Dieu leur prête longue vie, qui sont des jeunes éternels.

Hessel appartient à cette catégorie d’intellectuels libres qui ont la capacité d’échapper au poids de la stature académique et aux contraintes du statut d’universitaire, pour donner libre cours à leur indignation et se consacrer à propager le bien autour d’eux, sans se laisser faire prisonniers d’aucun enjeu.

EXETER – Commenting on the recent Algerian hostage crisis on an international news channel, one terrorism "expert" made a remarkable claim: "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was founded because of the so-called Arab Spring, after we abandoned our Libyan ally [Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi]." After enduring a few more inaccuracies, I felt compelled to put aside the students' papers that I was grading.

Let's start by stating the obvious: AQIM is not a product of the Arab Spring. AQIM exists because of the military coup that ended the "Algerian Spring" two decades ago. And it has not been strengthened by the Libyan revolution, but rather by the failure of state-building in North Mali, the absence of post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration in Algeria, and a lack of accountability for a shadowy Algerian security establishment whose brutal methods have proved woefully inadequate to the challenge.

AQIM's history can be traced directly to the coup staged by a handful of Algerian generals against President Chadli Bendjedid in January 1992. Bendjedid, whose memoirs were recently published (he died in October), gave Algeria its first relatively democratic constitution, lifting the ban on political parties and guaranteeing a minimum of basic rights, including freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience. He was the first Arab president to be criticized on state-owned TV (that is, without the critic disappearing afterwards). Algeria was the first Arab Spring country.